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PRELIMINARY COMMUNICATION
In the open market conditions the security of supply is limited. When a large number of players are
introduced in to the system, each of them pursuing only partial and limited goals and tasks, the totality of
care about security becomes vague. The analysis of the supply security in the responsibility chain, which is
made of producers, transport or transmission operators, distributors, suppliers, regulators and buyers,
shows that open market model carries inherent risks because final security instance is lacking. The proposal
is to introduce the State as the final instance that should be responsible for security, clear defining of the
responsibilities of all entities included in the responsibility chain, and for an efficient supervision over the
obligations.
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1. Introduction
In its broadest sense, the security of supply can be de-
fined as timely supply of energy in required quantities,
quality and timelines at reasonable prices. This pre-
sumes that the technological, infrastructural, legislative
and institutional assumptions are in place as to enable
that contracted services/energy can be delivered to the
consumers.
The essential determinates of the security of supply are
the following:
• The scale of deficit of primary energy sources at a na-
tional territory,
• Energy supply from distant regions by means of trans-
port, depending on energy product, as well as the risks
of supply disruption or limited vulnerability,
• Degree of development of energy infrastructure at na-
tional level and degree of interconnections with neigh-
boring countries,
• Renewable energy sources and the influence of volatil-
ity of resources, e.g. wind, solar energy, etc.,
• Legislation and institutional framework
• Energy prices.
The responsibility chain in security of supply encom-
passes: suppliers, distributors, transport or transmis-
sion system operators, producers, wholesalers, owners
of primary energy sources, regulators, state and local ad-
ministration, supranational associations, such as Euro-
pean Union and all of them has influence on security of
supply. Sum of all business interest of the involved sub-
jects has not necessarily to be equal to the interest of the
state, neither in scope nor in dynamics. On Security of
Supply have influences also subjects with different aims
and interests, like land owners, local authorities, state
administration, financial institution, etc. But for that sit-
uation should be an appropriate solution too. From the
consumers’ point of view, it is vital that conflicting inter-
ests or inadequacies of a part of the responsibility chain
can be compensated at other levels of the production-
to-buyer energy flow.
2. Definition of the term of security of
supply in the buyer-to-production
chain and responsible entities
In each of the energy sub-systems (oil, gas, electricity,
thermal energy, and renewables) the state of play is dif-
ferent, and such are the factors of influence. Each energy
sub-system and energy market had its own development
path and took its place in the energy mix of a specific
country and in energy supply. Some sub-systems are in-
fluenced by global factors (oil, gas and coal), while in
some regional (electricity) or local dimension prevails
(heat energy and renewables). Common to all energy
markets is the objective function: the production of elec-
tricity and thermal energy which mirrors all the changes
occurring in the energy markets that make part of the
chain.
Depending of a point of view, from buyers to producers
of primary energy, the following definitions of the security
of supply can be given:
• For buyers, security of supply is the supply of energy of
contracted quality in a timeline that best suits the
buyer's needs at reasonable price,
• For suppliers, security of supply is related to the qual-
ity of market, possibility of energy transport/transmis-
sion, and availability of spare capacities in case of
incidents,
• For distributors, security of supply is related to avail-
ability of the distribution networks,
• For transport/ transmission system operator, security
of supply is related to availability of the transmission
and distribution networks, connections with neigh-
boring countries, availability and serviceability of the
neighboring networks, markets of balancing energy,
ancillary services, share of renewable energy sources
and possibility of balancing them, and the responsibil-
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ity of suppliers and their discipline in balancing the
needs of their customers,
• For energy producers, security of supply is connected
to reliability of the installations, reliability of primary
energy product supply, reliability of energy trans-
port/transmission, reliability of energy distribution, de-
gree of market development and quality of suppliers,
• For wholesalers, security of supply depends on secure
purchase, transport/ transmission and all other enti-
ties in the producer-to-buyer chain,
• For regulators, security of supply is well-functioning of
all entities in fulfilment of their licence-based obliga-
tions,
• For states, security of supply is efficient energy supply
to buyers and ability to deal with effects of incidents
without affecting the supply to final customers. It is in-
fluenced by risks connected to energy imports in terms
of quantities and purchase arrangements.
Through the whole responsibility chain, security of
supply is influenced by:
• Technical/technological aspects related to operational
reliability of the parts of energy infrastructure,
• Energy/economic/geopolitical aspects related to supra-
national transports from place of production to indi-
vidual countries,
• Energy prices,
• Political relations and terrorism.
3. Analysis of the functioning of the
security of supply system in its
political (including all forms of
threats), technology, market and
economy related aspects
The concept of open market raises the question of the
role of the state: where it should not be involved and
where its presence is essential? Who is the final instance
responsible for security of supply in one country? For the
European Union important is the division of responsibil-
ity between the EU and the national states. In general, in-
creasing degree of liberalization strengthens the security
of supply simply due to the fact that with more partici-
pants in the market the flexibility of the energy system
improves automatically. Liberalization, however, may
bring new risks if the definition of the costs related to se-
curity of supply is left to the market. In this way, liberal-
ization transfers the prime responsibility for security of
supply from governments to market participants. But, is
this the best model for reducing the risks when security
of supply is concerned?
For energy buyers the final responsibility instance is
the state, because it has legislative, political, and finan-
cial powers and, finally, because certain minimal quanti-
ties of energy are a civilization need which any
democratic and socially responsible state must made
available to its citizens. On the other side, buyers enter in
legal (contractual) relation with suppliers, and thus re-
sponsibility lies with the energy companies.
The state can be considered responsible, or it must
have a leverage to influence security in the following
cases:
1. In the countries where the government administra-
tively sets the cap on prices of electricity, and there is
no market and the investments in the security of sup-
ply projects are reduced. The state administration, by
distorting market mechanisms, directly influences the
buyers' security of energy supply,
2. In situations where it is necessary to invest in energy
infrastructure in order to develop a new market, to
create new (unknown) customers or to increase energy
consumption by existing customers. The most com-
mon situation threatening the security of supply is
where the entire risk of investing in meeting the future
energy demand is carried over on energy companies
only. As a rule, energy companies can not meet unreal-
istic expectation of the state because they optimize the
dynamics of the projects realization according to their
own profit oriented interests. The experience shows
that realization of such projects is sluggish and their
dynamics is optimized in a way to alleviate the risks of
the energy companies and not primarily to address the
security concerns of the state,
3. In case of construction of energy infrastructure which
should reduce all risks that may affect security, re-
gardless of whether they come from politics, terror-
ism, natural disasters, or technical accidents. It is the
responsibility of each state to assess the risks and the
appropriate emergency provisions.
Regardless of how developed open energy markets are,
security of supply in its large extent is the responsibility
of the state. Those security issues that are in most part
the state's responsibility can be divided in four groups:
1. inadequacy of transmission/transmission infrastruc-
ture needed for supplying energy to the territory of an
individual state,
2. insufficient energy production in the territory of an in-
dividual state,
3. inadequate energy mix in final energy production,
4. inadequate infrastructure needed for energy storage in
case of incidents regardless of their causes.
Given the fact that most of the (European) countries are
energy importers, the fundamental issue of security of
supply is not the system's self-sufficiency but the dimin-
ishing to the least possible measure of the risks related to
import dependence. This presumes establishment of
strong relations with the neighboring countries in one's
environment and building supranational transport sys-
tems, for situations when energy can not be transported
through national grids/networks. Also, the connecting of
national systems and the construction of supranational
transport systems are not possible without an active role
of the state, through political arrangements, legislative
and administrative procedures and financial support. It
is vital to ensure the maximum utilization of the existing
cross-border capacities (especially in interconnection
power lines), and treat them in equal way as the internal
transport/transmission networks. However, many steps
in this regard may be opposed to the postulates of the
open market, because, on one hand, market opening
may enhance the security of supply, while on the other, it
brings new threats for system sustainability, especially in
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crisis situations. Financial intervention is needed for re-
alization of the project in such timeframes that are opti-
mal for security of supply and market development, and
not in those suitable for energy companies only. This is a
particularly sensitive issue in the natural gas sector.
The next issue refers to necessary production in a
state's territory, and comes from the assessment whether
cross-border trading can fully replace the production in
a state's territory. This does not include long term agree-
ments, no matter whether they come from the ownership
or energy trading only. This issue mostly refers to elec-
tricity. Namely, abandoning long term agreements, in fa-
vor of market development, may lead to increasing risks
and decreasing construction of new production
capacities.
Given the technological characteristics of electricity,
there is no such thing as absolute markets within the Eu-
ropean Union, but only a series of regional markets. Re-
gardless the operability degree of the transmission
networks, due to the losses the exchange of electricity at
large distances is not expected to make a significant part
of the market. This imposes a possible requirement to
set up an obligation for every country to cover a certain
amount (e.g., 85%) of its demand with its own production
and long term agreements, regardless of how the open
market transactions were contracted. The role of the
state is to create all necessary conditions to secure the
needed production infrastructure in order to sustain the
desired level of security.
Also, the security of supply can be weakened by an in-
adequate structure of primary energy mix in the power
generation or insufficient number and capacities of gas
supply routes. In gas industry it means that one depends
on a single import supply route, and in power industry it
means a too high dependence on one source only. In-
creasing the number of the supply routes or creating
better infrastructure is the responsibility of the state, in
cooperation, of course, with energy companies.
The incidents, ranging from political, terrorist or tech-
nological events to natural disasters, are reality to be
reckoned with, and their impact on security of supply
can be lowered only by building strategic storage capaci-
ties for gas and oil products.
4. Distribution of responsibility (EU)
- state-producer - operator-regulator -
supplier- customer
The concept of open market and institutional capacity
building are designed for well functioning markets. Re-
moving political power from the process of price setting
and creating economic conditions is a prerequisite for
the sector’s normal functioning and development and
maintaining supply security. However, the position and
the actions of the government are necessary in the area of
security of supply, besides the responsibilities of other
energy market participants. Thus, the responsibility is
distributed as follows:
1. National states and the EU are primarily responsible
for security of supply in terms of legislation, proce-
dures and actions in situations where market mecha-
nisms do not provide necessary dynamics in energy
infrastructure development. It is the state that over-
sees the security and takes appropriate measures,
2. Setting up tariffs is the responsibility of regulators,
and there should not be political interferences. Regu-
lators themselves assess security of supply, acting as a
control mechanism capable of recognizing problems
and taking appropriate measures,
3. Producers are oriented towards their own economic
interest. They can be imposed, under non-discrimina-
tory terms, the obligation to implement security of
supply provisions within their business activities,
4. Suppliers are responsible for security in relation to
business risks they infer to customers or to the system
as a whole,
5. Energy buyers must know themselves, their techno-
logical processes and be responsible for security of
supply when contracting purchase of energy.
5. Analysis of critical elements of
security of supply in open market
Apart from technological incidents, which affect security
and which are responsibility of the part of the energy sys-
tem where they occur so it must deal with the security
problems, critical elements which induce insecurity in to
energy systems usually come from situations which can
not be solved by a single energy entity. Most often such
problems come from political sphere, including interna-
tional conflicts, terrorism, political conflicts, and neigh-
bors’ disputes which all may include multiple countries.
Energy prices may be a critical element, in the coun-
tries where the government exercises influence on price
setting mechanism. The energy companies' financial in-
ability to realize the projects significant for security leads
to limited security.
Each country must permanently make long term secu-
rity assessments and have possibility to intervene at the
market, where market mechanism themselves are not
able to deliver the projects necessary for security of
supply.
The assessment of security of energy supply to final
customers at the national level must be based on relevant
indicators reflecting three interconnected and character-
istic areas: technical, economic and societal. Today, there
is no single methodology that would measure the security
of a national energy system or of an energy sector. In the
literature published so far proposed are many indicators
in order to get as good as possible insight in the energy
system of a particular state, energy sector or a company,
from energy, economic and environmental points of view.
Such indicators should facilitate a better implementation
of the energy and economic policies taking into account
many risks which may be: physical (energy forms), eco-
nomic, societal, and environmental. In essence, they all
present the picture of one segment of a complex system
and are mainly based on deterministic approach. How-
ever, the reality is much more intricate and it will be nec-
essary to put additional efforts in developing and
proposing the methodology which would allow to assess
the security of energy supply at the national level, and
would include all relevant factors with their uncertainties
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that come from economic, societal and technical nature
of energy from its source all way to the consumption
level.
6. Economic consequences of security
of supply
Security of supply is a real category with its costs, i.e., it
comes with a price. The security of supply costs must be
recognized in the price of services delivered. All re-
searches show that the price of non delivered energy, in-
cluding direct and indirect costs, is much higher than the
energy price itself and investments in security.
Each entity in the responsibility chain, from state to
buyer, can assess its own security of supply and potential
threats. It is the obligation of each energy entity. Their as-
sessments should include all the risks they can influence
and eliminate or reduce to a minimum.
For security as a whole, important is the security as-
sessment made at the top level of the responsibility pyra-
mid, i.e., government or ministries responsible for the
energy sector. Given the fact that only governments have
influence on non-energy factors, their measures may
work both ways: in favor of and contrary to security of
supply.
For the state, economic consequences of inadequate se-
curity may be either to invest in enhancing security of
supply or to suffer potential damage in form of decreas-
ing GDP or GNP.
The gas crisis in January 2009 clearly demonstrated
how necessary it had been to invest in additional infra-
structure in order to reduce the risks of supply disrup-
tions. Namely, the additional investments (e.g.,
investments in reverse flows) would have been many
times lower that the additional damage occurred due to
lack of such investments.
7. Possibilities of improving security of
supply system
Security of supply overcomes the capacities of each indi-
vidual country, except for a part of a group of large coun-
tries which may (eventually) achieve this security on their
own. In the European Union, not even the largest coun-
tries can achieve security of supply in full. Therefore,
there is a need to clearly identify the obligations at the EU
level and at the level of individual countries. This
includes:
• Uniform methodologies, criteria and indicators for as-
sessing security of each member state and the EU as a
whole,
• Obligation to produce annual reports on long term (10
years) security of supply for each member state and the
EU as a whole,
• Defining provisions and creating appropriate assump-
tions for the interventions by the EU and member
states when the assumptions for security of supply are
not in place. This refers to legislative administrative, fi-
nancial and in particular implementing scenarios de-
signed for fighting all kinds of obstructions of supply
(in January 2009 it took as long as ten days for Europe
to re-establish the gas flows from other directions),
• Unilateral planning and measures for maintaining se-
curity may be detrimental for other state (which was
demonstrated in the 2009 gas crisis). Thus, it is neces-
sary to enhance multilateral planning and coordination
(solidarity) in crisis situations,
• Establishing supranational supervision over all secu-
rity parameters in order to be able to timely identify the
supply security problems and set off coordinated mea-
sures at all three stages of crisis management (warning,
preparedness, emergency),
• Each country should have institutional solutions when
it comes to addressing the security issues, if market
mechanisms are not adequate to respond to security
threats,
• In all countries it is necessary to ensure real prices for
energy, so that the prices would not be an obstacle and
reason for reducing necessary investments and thus
undermining security of supply. The measures for pro-
tecting socially vulnerable consumers should be obliga-
tory,
• Improving the transport/transmission capacity alloca-
tion and congestion management system,
• Preparing supranational (regional, all-European) in-
vestment plan with a clear priority projects list with a
view to maintain security of supply.
8. Recommendations
1. The open energy market concept should be accompa-
nied with clearer and specific security responsibilities
of all entities participating in the market, including the
state,
2. In the energy tariffs security of supply must be recog-
nized as a part of the service that customers pay for,
3. In addition to technical and technological issues, the
security standards should also include the degree of
interconnections with neighbors, infrastructure devel-
opment in each country’s territory, and responsibility
towards multinational projects even if they do not gen-
erate immediate benefits,
4. Due to crucial importance of the secure energy supply
for the economy it is necessary to permanently imple-
ment appropriate supervising measures at all levels
(state, regulators, operators) and monitor the most in-
fluential elements of security, and publish reports, rec-
ommendations and provisions aimed at improving
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